xiii, 397 p. : 25 cm

"Prinz's account of consciousness makes two main claims: first consciousness always arises at a particular stage of perceptual processing, the intermediate level, and, second, consciousness depends on attention. Attention changes the flow of information allowing perceptual information to access memory systems. Neurobiologically, this change in flow depends on synchronized neural firing. Neural synchrony is also implicated in the unity of consciousness and in the temporal duration of experience. Prinz also explores the limits of consciousness. We have no direct experience of our thoughts, no experience of motor commands, and no experience of a conscious self. All consciousness is perceptual, and it functions to make perceptual information available to systems that allows for flexible behavior. Prinz concludes by discussing prevailing philosophical puzzles. He provides a neuroscientifically grounded response to the leading argument for dualism, and argues that materialists need not choose between functional and neurobiological approaches, but can instead combine these into neurofunctional response to the mind-body problem." -- Book jacket

Includes bibliographical references (p. 345-383) and index

Do we really need another theory of consciousness? -- Where is consciousness? : the intermediate level -- When are we conscious? : attention and availability -- How is consciousness realized? : gamma vectorwaves -- Which states can be conscious? : cognitive qualia reduced -- Why are we conscious? : action without enaction -- Whose consciousness? : the illusory self -- Whence the unity of consciousness? : attentional resonance -- What is consciousness? : neurofunctionalism -- Could consciousness be physical? : the brain maintained -- Conclusion : AIR compared

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